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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Was it proper for the trial Court to amend the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in the instant matter as requested by 
Plaintiff m her "Response to Motion to (1) Amend or Make 
Additional Findings, (2) Amend or Alter Judgment, and (3) for a 
New Trial," filed on or about March 24, 1997 and are said 
findings supported by the evidence and consistent with the 
court's prior findings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the court could enter the additional findings is a 
question of law, which is given no special deference. Bountiful 
v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). Under Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a), the standard of review for the trial court's finding of 
fact is that they shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Is the award of property and allocation of debts by the 
trial court an equitable distribution, and do the Court's 
findings support such an award? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court accords the trial court considerable 
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discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced 
parties. Although the courts actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity, the decision will not be affirmed if it 
is determined the trial court abused its discretion. Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). The appellate court will 
approve changes in a trial court's property and debt distribution 
"only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992). 
ISSUE NO. 3 
What property owned by the parties is separate property and 
were there any extraordinary circumstances justifying the 
inclusion of separate property in the marital estate? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court accords the trial court considerable 
discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced 
parties. Although the courts actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity, the decision will not be affirmed if it 
is determined the trial court abused its discretion. Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings 
supporting financial determinations. Findings are adequate only 
if they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
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facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on 
each factual issue was reached. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021. 
ISSUE NO. 4 
Is the alimony award proper in light of the property 
division ordered and findings made by the court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is that "Trial courts have 
considerable discretion in determining alimony and property 
distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal 
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). The trial court abuses its discretion when it fails 
to enter specific, detailed findings supporting financial 
determinations. Findings are adequate only if they are 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on each 
factual issue was reached. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 
(Utah App. 1993). 
ISSUE NO. 5 
Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the Defendant's 
mother's ranch, inherited by Defendant in 18 months after 5 after 
the trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The same is a question of law and the same "are reviewed for 
correctness and given no special deference on appeal." Bountiful 
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v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 
P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App . 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1995) 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.5 (1996) 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless 
the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a 
hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
The complete text of the above statutes are included in the 
addendum hereto. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
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Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court following the close 
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground, 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later 
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may 
amend its findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When 
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be 
5 
raised whether or not the party raising the question 
has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a 
motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial, 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an 
issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the 
minutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on March 2, 1957 and were separated 
in early January of 1995. The parties acquired as a gift from 
the Defendant's parents considerable real property during the 
marriage. Although a substantial portion of the property was 
sold, the value of the remaining real property acquired as a gift 
from Defendant's parents, exceeded $1,000,000. The parties had 
no other substantial assets of value. 
Shortly after the parties separated, Defendant was deeded 
from the estate of his parents a ranch which had been in his 
family for several generations. The deed, however, proved to be 
ineffective to provide clear title. Thus, the grantor therafter 
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prepared a second deed after the date of trial, all in accordance 
with the probate of defendant's mother's will. 
At the time of trial, Defendant, formerly a school teacher, 
was working in a struggling business jointly owned by the parties 
on a full-time without receiving a wage. In 1988, he had 
suffered a heart attack. 
At trial, the lower court awarded the Plaintiff 97.75% of 
the net value of the marital estate, together with $600 per month 
alimony, based upon Defendant's "ability to earn $3,000 per 
month,". 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on May 31, 
1997 (R. 002). A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered on 
September 8, 1995 (R. 114). Trial was conducted on October 10 
and 11, 1996. 
The court's "Judgment in re: Alimony, Property Division, 
Debt Allocation, and Attorneys Fees" was entered on March 3, 1997 
(R. 407). On March 13, 1997 Defendant filed a motion to (1) 
amend or make additional findings, (2) amend or alter judgment, 
and (3) for a new trial (R. 416). Plaintiff also filed a motion 
to supplement the judgment on March 19, 1997 (R. 431). In 
response to the parties' motions, an Amended Judgment was entered 
May 6, 1997 (R. 511). 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The trial court ordered that the findings in this matter be 
7 
modified and by the Amended Judgment in re: Alimony, Property 
Division, Debt Allocation, and Attorneys Fees, entered May 6, 
1997, distributed the assets and debts of the parties and award 
alimony to the Plaintiff. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and Plaintiff were married on March 2, 1957 (R. 
113). Between 1978 and 1995, Defendant worked as an elementary 
school teacher in the State of Utah (R. 83, 502, 718). He had 
been employed as a teacher in California for 12 years prior to 
that (R. 667). For several years before 1995, he worked during 
the summers with the school district(R. 675). 
Defendant's earned approximately $3,000 per month when 
teaching on a regular schedule, or $4,000 per month if he worked 
during the summers (R. 502, 677, 721, 725). Defendant worked on 
a regular schedule during the 1994/95 school year and planned to 
do so for 1995/96 (R. 676). 
Plaintiff was primarily employed as a homemaker (R. 502, 
816) . 
Defendant's parents, Ezra and Mae Lytle, gifted to the 
parties 40 acres of development property in 1975, on which the 
parties subsequently built their home (R. 623, 624). Portions of 
the development property were subsequently sold by the parties 
over several transactions to maintain a lifestyle in excess of 
that which would have been afforded on a school teacher's salary. 
The court found that xxalmost all" of the present day wealth of 
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the parties was received from Defendant's parents (R. 502). 
During the marriage, the parties acquired a business, "Hi-
Desert Marine.'' Both parties participated in the operation of 
said business, which the trial court found had negative net value 
of $150,000 at the time of trial (R. 504, 505). Although 
Defendant utilized his best efforts to improve the business, it 
was not a profitable operation (R. 505). However, the court 
found that the Defendant "is working hard to make that business 
profitable. . . ." (R. 505). 
The parties separated in January of 1995 (R. 193) . 
Plaintiff filed for divorce on May 31 of that same year (R. 002). 
At the time of the filing of Plaintiff's complaint, 22 acres 
remained of the development property (hereinafter "the 22 
acres"), earlier gifted from Defendant's parents, together with a 
development lot acquired with the proceeds therefrom, and the 
marital home (R. 590, 591, 625). The gross value of said 
properties, acquired as gifts from the Defendant's parents, was 
found by the Court to be $1,020,500. The parties had no other 
assets with a net positive value other than personal property. 
Through the probate of Defendant's mother's estate, a 
quitclaim deed was issued in February of 1995 to the Defendant to 
a ranch located in Washington County. (R. 650). At trial, the 
lower court received evidence that the deed was fatally defective 
to properly convey title, because the grantor was, inter alia, 
not properly identified and outside the chain of title (R. 650, 
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651, 652, 740). A corrected quitclaim deed was recorded in April 
of 1997, and Defendant properly received title to his mother's 
ranch through her will at that time, 18 months after the entry of 
the decree of divorce in this matter and five months after trial. 
The record has been amended to include a copy of said deed by 
order of the trial court entered on May 14, 1997 (R. 520). 
The only evidence given as to the value of the ranch was 
that it was worth $654,000, although the trial court, 
incongruously, not only took jurisdiction over the incohate 
ranch, but, further found its value to be $775,000 (R. 506, 653). 
The undisputed evidence given at trial indicates that the 
ranch is not a money making operation (R. 677, 678). The lower 
court, in its findings, described the ranching operation as 
"uneconomic" and "a hobby". (R. 503). 
The court entered a temporary order on August 29, 1995, 
prohibiting the parties from transferring or disposing of any 
property he or she has in his or her possession unless the other 
party consented. (R. 109) . 
For the 1995-6 school year, the Defendant took a leave of 
absence and later resigned from his position with the school 
district. (R. 502, 674). At the time of trial, Defendant was 60 
years old and had a heart attack several years previously (R. 
713, 714). The Defendant did not continue teaching due to the 
commitment required by the struggling business owned by the 
parties and other stresses related to his family and this action 
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(R. 940, 941). The principal at Defendant's former school 
testified that it was unusual for someone to still be teaching at 
age 60 (R. 717). The Defendant would have had to work at least 
three more years in order to obtain his full retirement (R. 670). 
The Defendant worked more than forty hours per week for the 
family business, High Desert Marine, after he stopped teaching, 
but did not receive a salary (R. 678, 743). The trial court 
found that "Defendant is working more than full-time at the two 
businesses, the Boat Shop, now known as High Desert Marine, and 
the Arma Coating business, and is making a good faith and genuine 
effort to produce income at the same or hopefully even above the 
levels that he enjoyed while he was teaching." (R. 504). The 
court made no finding that the Defendant was voluntarily 
uneremployed or unemployed. 
Defendant borrowed an additional $55,000 and contributed 
some of his inherited funds in order to invest in another 
business, Arma-Coating, after the parties separation (R. 505). 
After the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff did, without 
Defendant's consent or knowledge, place earnest money on a 
condominium, despite the fact that she had the sole occupation 
of the marital home (R. 98, 745). 
In order not to forfeit said earnest money and, the trial 
court found, to additionally provide a place for the Plaintiff to 
live, Defendant cashed in his retirement account, in the net 
amount of $56,015.00, the proceeds of which were used to pay off 
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a portion of the Arma-Coating loan in order to obtain financing 
of Plaintiff's condominium and also put a substantial down 
payment on Plaintiff's condominium (R. 503, 594, 665, 745, 749). 
The parties did concurrent therewith stipulated that 
Defendant could utilize his retirement to pay off a loan and 
would borrow the funds to complete the purchase of the condo (R. 
595). At trial, the court found no fault with either of the 
parties for having taken the effort to save Plaintiff's earnest 
money and to ensure that the Plaintiff had a reasonable dwelling 
(R. 928). In its findings, the court stated that while Defendant 
cashed in the retirement "voluntarily," the court acknowledged 
"the responsibility that he felt he had to provide for his then 
ex-wife's housing needs in a manner appropriate to her standing 
of living." (R. 503). 
At the time of trial, the District Court found that the 
condominium purchased by the Plaintiff had a negative net value 
of almost $15,000 (R. 506, 507). 
The trial court found that the Arma-Coating business 
generated "some" income but had a net value of $0 at the time of 
trial (R. 505). 
Plaintiff testified that she needed approximately $1,500 per 
month in order to maintain her standard of living (R. 822). 
At trial, counsel for the Plaintiff conceded that the ranch 
was not part of the marital estate, and did not assert a claim 
thereto (R. 600, 601). The court, at a hearing of Defendant's 
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motion to amend the judgment in this matter, did state that: "My 
understanding was that it was the understanding of the parties . 
. . that Mr. Lytle would receive the ranch . . . and that was his 
inheritance from his parents; that was their testamentary intent; 
that the parties were assuming he would receive the ranch/' (R. 
1039). Perhaps because of this, the court made no specific 
finding that the ranch was the inherited and separate property of 
the Plaintiff, and not part of the marital estate. 
The Defendant made allegations of adultery, but the trial 
court found that those allegations had not been proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence (R. 504). No other grounds for a 
finding of fault in the divorce were asserted by Plaintiff. 
After trial, the Court, in its Judgement entered March 3, 
1997, did award the marital home, the condominium, the building 
lot, and one-half of the 22 acres to the Appellee. Appellant was 
awarded the remaining one-half of the 22 acres. He was also 
awarded the business, with a negative net value, and ordered to 
assume the marital debts. The value of the marital property, as 
found by the trial court, awarded to each party is as follows: 
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Property or Debt 
22 acres of 
development 
property 
Building lot 
Personal property 
Drive 
Condominium 
Mortgage on 
condominium 
Hi-Desert Marine 
Business 
ArmaCoating 
Business 
Mortgage on 
marital home 
Home equity line 
on marital home 
Debt on 
Defendant's 
Corvette 
Accountant fees 
Method of Acquisition 
Gift from Defendant's 
parents (originally 40 
acres) 
Acquired during 
marriage with property 
gifted from Defendant's 
parents 
Acquired during 
marriage 
parents 
Purchased by Plaintiff 
after separation 
Incurred after 
separation 
Acquired by parties 
during marriage 
Acquired by Defendant 
since separation 
Incurred during 
marriage 
Incurred during 
marriage 
Incurred during 
marriage 
Value of marital assets awarded to each 
party: 
Percentage of marital assets awarded to 
each party: 
Value 
Awarded to 
Defendant 
317,000.00 i 
54,000.00 
-149,574.69 
-150,000.00 
0.00 
-20,009.83 
-16,039.58 
-9,767.32 
-10,546.00 
15,062.58 
2.25% 
Value 
Awarded to 
Plaintiff 
317,000.00 
35,000.00 
16,725.00 
149,500.00 
135,000.00 
653,225.00 
97.75% 
(R. 505-8) 
By said division, Plaintiff was awarded 97.75% of the net 
value of the marital estate. 
The trial court further awarded Plaintiff alimony in the 
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amount of $600 per month, based upon Plaintiff's expenses of 
$2,000 per month, her income of $540 per month, and the 
reasonable rental value of the marital home awarded to the 
Plaintiff in the amount of $850 per month. Defendant was found 
to have the "ability to produce income" of $3,000 per month and 
to have expenses of $2,400 per month. The lower court further 
considered the fact that "Plaintiff also has the building lot 
which is probably something that she could sell and live off for 
quite a while and maybe not even have to work for a period of 
time. . . ." (R. 508). After the sale of the 22 acres, the court 
ordered that alimony be reduced to $300 per month (R. 514). 
On or about March 13, 1997, Defendant did motion to (1) 
amend or make additional findings regarding whether the mountain 
meadows ranch was marital property; (2) to alter or amend the 
Court's judgment regarding the property award; and (3) for a new 
trial on the issue of whether the ranch was marital property. 
The court by its order entered May 30, 1997, denied said motion 
(R. 531). 
However, at the hearing of Defendant's motion on March 27, 
1997, the Court did agree with counsel for the Plaintiff that 
additional findings were required. The Court stated that: 
I find that those provided and proposed and propounded 
in [Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion] to be appropriate to this division. I'm not 
going to change the division of this property, and I 
would like those findings incorporated pursuant to your 
request. . . . I think these are an extraordinary 
circumstances case. If its not, then the Court of 
Appeals can tell me, but that is my ruling (R. 1123). 
15 
Those findings were not proposed by the Plaintiff in a memo and 
memorandum as provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 52, but were suggested 
by Plaintiff in a response to Defendant's motion on March 24, 
1997, more than 10 days after the final judgment was entered in 
this matter. Said additional findings, although indirectly 
clarifying that the ranch was not marital property, contradict 
the court's prior findings. They (1) fault the Appellant for 
terminating his employment on the eve of full retirement and 
liquidating his retirement account, (2) stated that the alimony 
award was $900 short of Plaintiff being able to meet her 
financial needs, and (3) find that the ranch ought to be 
considered in the award of marital property (R. 508, 509). 
On or about March 19, 1997, Plaintiff filed a motion to 
correct certain clerical errors in the judgment and findings and 
sought other relief. The Court, by its order entered April 18, 
1997, did order that the judgment and findings entered in this 
matter should be amended due to certain clerical errors but 
denied the remaining relief sought by the Plaintiff. The amended 
Judgment and Findings were entered May 6, 1997. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
1. TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 52 IN MAKING FINDINGS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) provides that a party may make a 
motion to amend or make additional findings not later than 10 
days after entry of judgment. In the instant matter, the 
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additional findings adopted by the court were filed by Plaintiff 
more than 10 days after the entry of the Judgment. No provision 
is made under Rule 52 for the court to make a sua sponte 
alteration of the findings. 
2. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
The court made four additional findings, which are addressed 
sequentially below. 
A. FINDING 41 
The court found that: 
The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment on 
the eve of full retirement. His doing so deprived the 
Plaintiff of the benefit of his income and the benefit 
of his retirement account had he worked until he became 
entitled to full retirement benefits. 
The total benefit of the retirement account was less than $70,000 
before taxes and does not justify such a dispoportionate award of 
property. Also, the lost income to the Defendant is irrelevant, 
as the court awarded the Plaintiff sufficient alimony to meet her 
needs. She was awarded alimony of $600 per month, which, with 
her income of $540 and rental income of $850 per month, is 
sufficient to meet her needs, as found by the court, of $2,000 
per month. 
In any case, assuming the Defendant had continued teaching 
school, his income would not have been around the $3,000 per 
month already imputed to him by the Court. His expenses would 
not have been any lower, leaving the same $600 available for 
alimony, regardless of whether he was still teaching. 
17 
B. FINDING 42 
In its amended findings, the court found that: 
The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court 
Order, liquidated his retirement account. Although 
some of those funds were used to assist the Plaintiff 
with reference to acquisition of her condominium, most 
of the funds were used to pay a debt incurred in 
conjunction with the Defendant's opening a business 
against the Plaintiff's will, while the parties were 
still married, as asset which, according to the Court's 
findings, now has no value. In essence, the Defendant 
dissipated almost all of that retirement account. 
Plaintiff should receive a greater share of the balance 
of the marital estate. 
This finding faults the Defendant for liquidating the 
retirement in violation of a temporary order and for dissipating 
the retirement account. Again, the $70,000 retirement account is 
insufficient grounds to award the Plaintiff 97.75% of a marital 
estate with a net worth of two-thirds of million dollars. 
The temporary order only prohibited the Defendant from 
alienating property without the Plaintiff's consent. The 
Plaintiff and Defendant did stipulate to the uses the retirement 
funds would be put. Further, the court, in its findings, found 
that the Defendant did liquidate the retirement account to put a 
substantial down payment on Plaintiff's condominium and pay off 
other debts, including a portion of the Arma-Coating debt, in 
order to obtain financing for Plaintiff's condominium. Although 
the court found that the Defendant did liquidate his retirement 
account voluntarily, it "acknowledged the responsibility that he 
felt he had to provide for his then ex-wife's housing needs in a 
manner appropriate to her standing of living." (R. 503). There 
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was no evidence given that Defendant did dissipate "almost all" 
of the retirement account: a portion was contributed to the 
condominium, some was used to pay the Arma-Coating debt, and the 
court made no findings, and there was no evidence taken, 
regarding the remainder. 
Equitably, the Plaintiff also invested the earnest money in 
the condominium without Defendant's knowledge or consent. The 
condominium had a net negative value at the time of trial. 
Plaintiff elected to purchase the condominium and incurr the 
additional debt when neither of the parties had a substantial 
income. The trial court is attempting to punish the Defendant 
for actions substantially similar to those of the Plaintiff. 
C. FINDING 43 
The third additional findings provides that: 
The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at 
the standard of living to which she is entitled with 
the amount of alimony awarded by the Court and her own 
earned income. According to the trial Court's 
findings, although the Defendant would have sufficient 
income to meet his needs by paying $600.00 per month to 
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of 
alimony, still falls approximately $900.00 short each 
month of being able to meet her financial needs. 
This finding is contradicted by the court's other findings 
regarding the Plaintiff's income and needs, and in any case is 
insufficient to award the Plaintiff 97.75% of such a substantial 
estate. One-half of the marital estate has a value, as 
established by the court, of over one-third million dollars. 
With such a sizable estate, Plaintiff should have sufficient 
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income to meet her needs. 
D. FINDING 44 
The final additional finding related to the court states: 
Although, technically, the Plaintiff may not have 
acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows 
Ranch because of work she performed on that property 
during the parties' marriage and while it was still 
titled in the name of the Defendant's parents, 
equitably, her contribution toward that asset ought to 
be considered and supports the Court's ultimate award 
of marital property. 
The court seems to indicate that the ranch was deeded to 
Plaintiff as some sort of compensation. However, no such 
evidence was given at trial. The deeds and probate records, 
which Judge Shumate inspected, clearly establish that the 
inheritance was to Clint Lytle only; if the ranch was intended to 
be some sort of compensation, the Defendant's parents could have 
so provided. In any case, can the Plaintiff possibly claim that 
she was not adequately compensated for her efforts on behalf of 
the Defendant's parents: the 40 acres of property gifted to 
Plaintiff and Defendant by Defendant's parents during the 
marriage, had a value, using the current values found by the 
court, of $1,520,000. No evidence was given that Defendant 
expected any compensation from the estate of Defendant's parent 
for her efforts, or that they agreed to so compensate her. 
Additionally, there is no indication from the record that 
Defendant received a disproportionate share of his parent's 
estate for Plaintiff's "contribution". 
The court's theory awards the Plaintiff an equitable 
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interest in property which was not owned by the parties or 
acquired during the marriage of for that matter during the 
entirety of the trial and post-trial proceedings. How can the 
Plaintiff have an equitable interest in property in which the 
parties' has absolutely no right or interest? Defendant did not 
obtain title to the property until after the parties' separation, 
or, ultimately, after trial. Until the proper deed was recorded, 
Defendant had a mere expectancy, and no right to the ranch. What 
the court is awarding the Plaintiff is an equitable interest in 
the estate of the Defendant's parents rather than the marital 
estate. 
The court made no findings to justify such a result. Under 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993), the trial 
court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, 
detailed findings supporting its financial determinations. 
Findings are adequate if they are sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. There 
are no sufficiently detailed findings regarding Plaintiff's 
"contribution" for this court to determine what subsidiary facts 
justify such a result. 
In any case, the trial court's finding is directly contrary 
to the directions given in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304(Utah 1988). In Mortesen, Justice Howe, speaking to the issue 
of making a division of the marital property, held that trial 
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courts should not award the other spouse an additional amount of 
property equal to the gift or inheritance in order to equalize 
the distribution even when the gift or inheritance is received 
during the marriage. If the trial court were to make such an 
offset, it would have the effect of depriving the heir spouse of 
the benefit of his gift or inheritance. This rule "accords with 
the normal intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts 
and inheritances should be kept within their family and 
succession should not be diverted because of divorce." 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. 
II. PROPERTY DIVISION 
1. THE COURT FAILED TO SEPARATE MARTIAL AND SEPARATE PROPERTY 
The Court made no specific finding regarding whether the 
ranch was marital property. The trial court should "first 
properly categorize the parties' property as part of the martial 
estate or as the separate property of one of the other." Burt v. 
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court 
abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed 
findings supporting its financial determinations. Hall v. Hall, 
858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993). In the above two cases, 
the trial courts failed to identify marital and separate property 
and the cases were remanded to the trial court in order for 
additional findings to be made. 
Although the trial court failed to make a specific finding, 
there may be a record sufficient to conclude that the ranch is 
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separate property. First, the Plaintiff's counsel did concede at 
trial that the ranch was separate property and that Plaintiff did 
not have a claim thereto. (R. 600, 601). Second, the Court did 
state at a hearing after trial that the ranch was separate 
property. (R. 1039) . Third, it is clear from the circumstances 
of the case, as outlined below, that the ranch could not be 
marital property. 
2. THE RANCH IS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY 
Inherited property is generally regarded as separate from 
the marital estate. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) . Courts have considered inherited property as part of 
the martial estate when the other spouse has by his or her 
efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or 
donated property, when the parties have inextricably commingled 
the property with marital property so that it has lost its 
separate character, or when the recipient spouse has contributed 
all of part of the property to the marital estate. Burt, 799 
P.2d at 1169. 
In this instant matter, the Court made no specific finding 
that the ranch was separate property. However, it is clear from 
the record that Defendant did not obtain clear title to the 
inherited property until after the parties were separated, or, 
possibly, after trial. The Plaintiff has had no opportunity to 
augment, maintain, or protect the inherited or donated property. 
At the time the property was quitclaimed to the Defendant, the 
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parties were already separated. Further, there was no 
opportunity to inextricably commingle the property with marital 
property, nor has the Plaintiff contributed all or part of the 
property to the marital estate. In fact, virtually all of the 
marital estate was contributed by Defendant's parents. 
3. THIS IS NOT A CASE OF EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
When inherited property has not lost it identity, the 
court may award it to the non-heir spouse in lieu of alimony and 
in other extraordinary situations when equity so demands. Burt, 
799 P.2d at 1169. This is apparently the justification used by 
the court in its award of property(R. 1123). However, this 
exception is not applicable to this case for two reasons. First, 
alimony was awarded in this case. Second, extraordinary 
circumstances can justify the award of inherited property, not a 
disproportionate award of marital property. Burt, id. 
In any event, no extraordinary circumstances were described 
by the court. The four additional findings made by the court, 
described above, are hardly exceptional. The retirement account 
was liquidated for Plaintiff's benefit, the alimony awarded is 
sufficient for her needs, and the trial court can not award the 
Plaintiff an interest in the estate of the Defendant's parents. 
A case of exception circumstances was Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369 (Utah 1988) . In Noble, the husband shot the wife in the 
head at close range with a rifle while she was lying on their 
bed. She was permanently disabled. The court therein approved 
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an award of the husband's premarital property to the wife. 
4. THE COURT MAY NOT GIVE DEFENDANT A SMALLER PORTION OF THE 
MARITAL ESTATE TO OFFSET HIS INHERITANCE 
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and fifty percent of marital property. Hall v. 
Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Burt v. Burt 799 
P.2d at 1172. An unequal distribution of the parties' marital 
property must be accompanied by findings justifying the decision. 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022. 
The trial court in this matter basically awarded the 
Plaintiff the entire net value of the marital estate and the 
Defendant the ranch with sufficient funds to pay the marital 
debts. This leaves Plaintiff with a net value of $650,0000 and 
Defendant with $790,000. When the court made its decision, Judge 
Shumate was under the mistaken impression that the marital debts 
were actually $100,000 greater than the parties had stipulated, 
resulting in an award of $690,000 to the Defendant and $650,000 
to Plaintiff, which is fairly close to a 50/50 split (R. 1038). 
This "equitable" award basically offsets Defendant's inheritance 
against his interest in the marital estate. 
This Court of Appeals, in Mortensen v. Mortensen. disaproved 
of this practice. That case provided that in dividing the 
marital estate: 
the donee or heir spouse should not lose the benefit of 
his or her gift or inheritance by the trial court's 
automatically or arbitrarily awarding the other spouse 
an equal amount of the remaining property which was 
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acquired by their joint efforts to offset the gift or 
inheritance. Any significant disparity in the division 
of the remaining property should be based on an 
equitable rationale other than on the sole fact that 
one spouse is awarded his or her gifts or inheritance. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. 
In Mortensen, supra, the trial court awarded the husband 
stock inherited by him during the marriage and awarded the wife 
two-thirds of the remaining marital estate. In the opinion by 
Justice Howe, the court reviewed prior Utah case law. The court 
cites with approval cases where property was awarded to the 
spouse which inherited it or brought it into the marriage, 
including Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes 
v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 
610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980); Humphries v. Humphries, 520 P.2d 193 
(1974); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). 
After further reviewing the above cases and the law of other 
jurisdictions, the Court held that: 
trial courts making "equitable" property division 
pursuant to Section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with 
the rule of most other jurisdictions and with the 
division made in may of our own cases, generally award 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance 
during the marriage . . . to that spouse, . . . unless 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or 
expenses contributed to the enhancement, maintainence, 
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an 
interest in it, . . . or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or 
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift 
of an interest therein to the other spouse. Cf. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. The Court noted exceptions where 
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part of the gift or inheritance was awarded in lieu of alimony. 
Otherwise, the property should be divided equally between the 
parties. Id. 
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the 
Defendant received an inheritance, the value of which was 
substantially increased during the marriage. Proceeds from the 
inheritance were utilized by the Defendant to purchase a home. 
At trial, the Court awarded the Plaintiff the marital home and 
other assets. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court's 
intended analysis "was apparently that Plaintiff was entitled to 
an equitable offset against" the Defendant's inherited property. 
The Court stated that "Each party is presumed to be entitled to 
all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the 
marital property." Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172. The trial court, on 
remand, was instructed to "first properly categorize the parties 
property as part of the marital estate or as separate property, " 
after which point the court may consider exceptional 
circumstances. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172. Here, as discussed 
above, the findings made by the court do not show sufficient 
"extraordinary circumstances." 
In Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973), the 
Plaintiff, after the commencement of the divorce proceedings, but 
before trial, received an inheritance from her uncle, Dr. Hirth. 
The Court awarded the Plaintiff sixty percent of the substantial 
marital estate, alimony and attorneys fees. Defendant appealed 
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on the grounds that the court failed to take into consideration 
the plaintiff's interest in the estate of Dr. Hirth and whatever 
expectancy she may have had in the estate of her elderly mother. 
The court took no consideration of these factors. Like Dubois, a 
party in this action had, after the parties separation but before 
trial, received a substantial inheritance or had an expectancy of 
receiving an inheritance. As in that case, those factors do not 
effect the distribution of the marital estate. 
In the case of Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (1979), the wife 
was awarded 90 percent of the assets accumulated by the parties 
during the marriage. The Court stated: 
When a marriage has failed, a court's duty is to 
consider the various factors relating to the situation 
and to arrange the best allocation of the property and 
the economic resources of the parties so that the 
parties and their children can pursue their lives in as 
happy and useful manner as possible. If it appears 
that the decree is so discordant with an equitable 
allocation that it will morelkely lead to further 
difficulties and distgress than to serve the desired 
objective, then a reappraisal of the decree must be 
undertaken. In view of these principles, it is our 
view that the property award in this case is far too 
disparate and that the decree must be modified. 
Read, 594 P.2d at 872. The "far too disparate" award in the Read 
case at least allowed the husband 10% of the marital estate. Mr. 
Lytle was only allotted 2.25% of the assets of his marriage by 
the trial court. 
The trial court's award does not allow the parties to 
"pursue their lives" as proscribed by Read, supra. The 
Defendant's portion of the marital estate will just cover the 
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debts he has been ordered to pay, leaving him with two 
unprofitable businesses and the ranch, which also produces no 
income. The Plaintiff, meanwhile, is awarded alimony, a home, 
and over half a million dollars of other assets, debt free. 
5. THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE RANCH AND SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE COURT 
The Court does not have jurisdiction over property which the 
parties do not own at the time of the divorce being entered. See 
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977). There are two 
factors which govern the includability of assets as marital 
property subject to division: 
First, all assets acquired by the parties during the 
marriage are to be considered by the trial court when making 
an equitable distribution, unless the law specifically 
prevents the court from considering a particular asset. 
Second, a marital asset is defined as any right that has 
accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit. 
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d at 837. 
Here, evidence introduced at trial indicates that, because 
of problem with the chain of title and deed, Defendant did not 
have title to the ranch property. This asset was not "acquired 
during the marriage" under the above standard. The Defendant had 
no enforceable right in the property, but only an expectancy. 
Further, the Defendant's expectancy was not a "right that has 
accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit." 
III. ALIMONY AWARD 
1. ERROR TO AWARD ALIMONY IN THIS ACTION 
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The award of alimony is inapropriate in this case, where the 
Plaintiff, even if she was awarded one-half of the marital 
estate, would have sufficient resources to meet her needs. In 
Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973), the Plaintiff, was 
awarded sixty percent of the substantial marital estate, alimony 
and attorneys fees. The Court held that "it appears that the 
assets awarded to the plaintiff [are] sufficient to maintain her 
in the manner to which she has been accustomed without periodic 
payments from the defendant," and reduced the award of alimony to 
$1.00 per year. 
In Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the 
Defendant had substantial inherited property and was awarded 
alimony. The court of appeals, in a footnote, questioned whether 
alimony was appropriate where the defendant had substantial 
accumulated wealth, and stated that "Proper distribution of 
inherited property should have come first, and only then would 
alimony be considered." Burt, 799 P.2d at 1170. Half of the 
martial estate in this matter would amount to one-third of a 
million dollars, almost all of which was donated by the 
Defendant's parents. With such an award, alimony is inapropriate 
in this case. 
2. INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO IMPUTE INCOME TO DEFENDANT 
The court also improperly imputed income to the Defendant. 
In Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the trial court 
imputed income to the Defendant. The Court of Appeals held that 
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the trial court could not impute income for alimony and child 
support without making the statutorily required findings under 
Section 78-45-7.5 (7) (b) that he was voluntarily underemployed. 
The court in this action also made no such finding. It is clear 
from the record that Defendant is not making the $3,000 per month 
imputed to him by the court. The court merely states that he is 
capable of making that amount. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this case clearly attempted to equitably 
apportion the property of the parties by improperly including the 
Defendant's inherited property in his calculations; property 
which, in fact, properly came in the Defendant's possession only 
after trial. The Court of Appeals has held in Burt and 
Mortensen, supra, that a trial court can not consider an 
inheritance to unequally divide he marital estate. The theory of 
the Plaintiff, adopted by the trial court in its amended 
findings, argues that the Plaintiff should be awarded some sort 
of equitable interest in the ranch. However, for this theory to 
succeed, this equitable interest would have to arise while the 
property was not even owned by the parties. Reaching such a 
conclusion awards the Plaintiff an equitable interest in the 
estate of the Defendant's parents, contrary to their wishes, 
rather than in the marital estate, and basically re-writes the 
will of Ezra and Mae Lytle. 
The Plaintiff also argues that the Defendant should be 
31 
punished for liquidating his inheritance, despite the stipulation 
of the parties and the fact that, as the court found, the 
retirement was liquidated by the Plaintiff in order to provide a 
suitable home for the Plaintiff, which Plaintiff purchased 
despite already occupying the marital home. 
The additional findings made by the District Court should be 
reversed are contradicted by the record and the court own prior 
findings, and should be vacated as clearly erroneous and on 
procedural grounds. 
The court in awarding alimony should first consider the 
property of the parties. Where, as here, the marital estate is 
substantial and the Plaintiff is left largely debt free, no award 
of alimony should have been made, both because the it is 
unwarranted, and because the trial court imputed income to the 
Defendant but failed to find that he was voluntarily 
underemployed. 
An equitable distribution of the marital property in this 
case would award each party one-half of the marital estate. 
Plaintiff could still receive, free and clear of all debts, her 
condominium, the marital home, which could provide her with 
rental income as found by the trial court, and an the undeveloped 
lot. By awarding the entire 22 acres to the Defendant and all 
of the marital debts, each party would receive marital assets 
worth approximately $330,000. A table showing this proposed 
distribution is included in the addendum. 
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The "far to disparate" award in Read, supra, was much more 
equitable than the present action. Clint Lytle was awarded 2.25% 
of the marital estate, almost all of the value of which was 
derivative of substantial inter vivos gifts made by his parents. 
In order to allow the parties to "pursue their lives," the court 
should order that the marital property be distributed as 
described above or remand the case to the district court for 
further findings consistent with Utah law. 
Equally simply stated, the lower court in light of Utah law 
and Plaintiff's concession that she made no claim to the ranch of 
Defendant's parents, should not have considered that "to be 
inherited" property in its calculations. If Defendant's parents 
had wanted to name the Plaintiff in their will, they could have 
done so. The lower court's award of substantially all of the 
marital estate in this case is erroneous and jurisdictionally 
overreaching. 
DATED this 11th day of August, 1997. 
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two copies of the attached Brief of Appellant upon G. Michael 
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G. Michael Westfall 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, UT 847 
Attorney of Record 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-5 (1993) 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts 
or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an 
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the 
payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the 
parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective 
creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, 
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties1 separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 
62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or 
A. 1 
after January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an 
order assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month 
check processing fee to be included in the amount withheld and 
paid to the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of 
Human Services for the purposes of income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing 
the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the 
custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace 
A. 2 
officer enforcement, the court may include in an order 
establishing a visitation schedule a provision, among other 
things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court ordered 
visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the 
court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys1 
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the 
court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of 
the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a 
visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party 
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors 
in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
A. 3 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of 
living, existing at the time of separation, in determining 
alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). However, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living 
that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold 
of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in 
dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of 
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, 
the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration 
dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the 
condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
A. 4 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of 
the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at 
the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if 
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time 
prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer 
period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, 
any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that 
former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found 
A. 5 
to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment 
and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.5 (1996) 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned 
sources, except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, 
rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, 
pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous 
marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, 
workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, 
disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the 
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if 
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent 
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, 
the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
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(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job 
Training Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or 
General Assistance; and 
© other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a 
parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a 
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses 
required for self-employment or business operation from gross 
receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or 
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an 
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to 
allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be 
deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from 
the amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on 
an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average 
gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. 
Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer 
statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the 
most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not 
reasonably available. Verification of income from records 
maintained by the Office of Employment Security may be 
A. 7 
substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
© Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine 
whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under 
Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent 
stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a 
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based 
upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived from 
work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings 
for persons of similar backgrounds in the community. 
© If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed 
at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To 
impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or 
the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter 
specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the 
imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions 
exist: 
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents1 minor 
children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn; 
A. 8 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent!s presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who 
is the subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child 
in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income, 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the 
earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to the 
parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the 
amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other 
unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a 
parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
A. 9 
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SAMUEL G. DRAPER (Bar No. 7050) 
HUGHES & READ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801)673-4892 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRLENE LYTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CLINTON EZRA LYTLE, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 954500316 
Judge James L. Shumate 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for trial on the 10th day of October, 1996, before the Court, 
sitting without a jury, the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding, 
the Plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by her counsel, G. Michael Westfall, of Gallian, 
Westfall Wilcox and Wright, and the Defendant appearing in person and being represented by his 
counsel, Samuel G. Draper, of Hughes & Read, and the Court having granted Defendant's motion to 
bifurcate, and a decree of divorce having been entered on or about September 8, 1995, reserving the 
issues of support, property division, and attorney's fees for determination at trial, and the Court having 
heard the evidence offered by the parties admitted herein, and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT MAKES AND ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
pv 
'J;;TY 
1. The parties were married on the 2nd of March, 1957, and were divorced on the 8th of 
September, 1995, under a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce. 
2. During the parties' marriage, the Defendant taught school in California. 
3. Thereafter the family moved to Utah where the Defendant worked for approximately 7 
years for his father in the ranching operation and then began teaching school where he taught within the 
Washington County School District for a period of 17 years, while also during that period of time 
working on a ranching operation with his father, and after his father's death, he continued to work the 
ranching operation. 
4. In 1995 the Defendant took a leave of absence from the Washington County School 
District, but did not return to that employment thereafter. 
5. Prior to his leave of absence, he had earned as much as $4,000.00 per month. 
6. At the time of his leave of absence, his income earning capacity, in view of his 
experience, his age, and his health, including cardiac problems in 1988 and surgery at that time, the 
Court finds that the Defendant's earning capacity was $3,000.00 per month. 
7. During the term of the marriage, the Plaintiff raised the family, assisted the Defendant on 
the ranch, kept the house, bottled fruit, helped in the ranching operation, and generally supported both 
parties' economic efforts in making the marriage and the family operation work. 
8. The parties have substantial assets, but received almost all of the present-day wealth from 
the Defendant's parents in the forms of gifts of real estate, either by inheritance, or out-right gift during 
the term of the marriage. 
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9. However, on top of those gifts, their joint efforts of producing income and, also, in non-
dollar producing efforts, but valuable efforts, contributed by the Plaintiff, Mrs. Lytle, added to the values 
produced by the gifts and inheritance from the Defendant's father and mother. 
10. Their life style prior to the marriage was not lavish, but certainly comfortable. 
11. They were able to obtain and have new cars; take trips and short vacations; dine out on 
regular basis; acquire fur and some amounts of jewelry for the Plaintiff; and the Defendant was able to 
continue an uneconomic, what the Court would describe as a hobby, ranching operation on the property 
at Mountain Meadow. 
12. Since the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff has taken employment at J.C. Penny's where 
she is able to produce about $540.00 per month. 
13. Since the time of the divorce, the Defendant withdrew $56,015.00 from his retirement 
account. 
14. That is a net to him, as a substantial portion for taxes was retained. 
15. The Defendant made the choice to use that money to refinance the Arma Coating 
business and also put a substantial down payment on the Condominium which the Plaintiff is now 
occupying. 
16. The Court determines that Defendant did that voluntarily, but acknowledges the 
responsibility that he felt he had to provide for his then ex-wife's housing needs in a manner appropriate 
to her standard of living. 
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17. Allegations of adultery have been made in this matter, but as the Court has previously 
ruled that is not proven by the burden of proof required. 
18. At the present setting, the Plaintiff remains single, living in her condominium, working at 
Penny's, and unable to meet her needs at the present time with anywhere near the level that had been 
hers during the term of the marriage, and her ability to meet her needs now falls short of her actual 
needs. 
19. Since the time of the divorce the Defendant has remarried, is living at his wife's home, 
and is working more than full-time at the two businesses, the Boat Shop, now known as Hi-Desert 
Marine, and the Arma Coating business, and is making a good-faith and genuine effort to produce 
income at the same or hopefully even above the levels that he enjoyed while he was teaching. 
20. The Plaintiffs expenses are $2,000.00 per month. 
21. The Court finds that the Defendant's reasonable expenses are $2,400.00 a month. 
22. The debt on the Cadillac has now been paid, and is no longer an obligation. 
23. The Corvette, which is included in Defendant's claims for expenses, is a drain upon the 
parties assets and is an unaffordable luxury with its high insurance and monthly payment which should 
be sold. 
24. At the present time, the Plaintiff and Defendant jointly own the business, Hi-Desert 
Marine, which the Court finds has a negative net value. 
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25. The net value affixed by the Court is somewhat less than the accounting testimony at the 
time of trial, but the Court is convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the net value of Hi-
Desert Marine is in the neighborhood of negative $150,000.00. 
26. That business, while all the parties agree should be awarded to Mr. Lytle, has a negative 
impact on the balance sheet of $150,000.00. 
27. The Defendant has run Hi-Desert Marine, paid the parties' son and supported their son 
and his family from that obligation, has tried to get enough money out of it to pay the temporary orders 
of support which the Court has made, and has tried to make some money himself. 
28. The Defendant has attended training and has relocated the business. 
29. The Court is convinced that Mr. Lytle is working hard to make that business profitable 
and also to make the Arma Coating business equally profitable. 
30. The Court finds that Arma Coating's net worth is about $0, but has had the ability to 
generate some income and acquire some assets. 
31. The Arma Coating business was acquired by an initial investments of $55,000.00, which 
was borrowed, but that was refinanced with some of the money from Defendant's retirement and some of 
the money from the Defendant's inheritance. 
32. At the present time, the parties have the following assets with the following stipulated 
values: 
a. The home and lot located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, is worth 
$149,500.00 and is more particularly described as follows: 
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Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42 
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East 
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning. 
b. The condo on 489 Ridgeview Drive, St. George, is worth $135,000.00, and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat T \ a Planned Unit Development 
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington 
County Recorder. 
c. The building lot lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black 
Hill in St. George, Utah, is worth $35,000, and is more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in 
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah. 
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record. 
d. The 22 acres of real estate development property has a gross value of 
$836,000.00, but because of the low basis in this property held by the parties, upon its sale an 
approximately $202,000.00 tax impact will be realized, so the net value of the development property is 
$634,000.00. 
e. There is a possibility of an asset in Carson City, Nevada, but the parties have 
agreed to split that evenly, half and half, if there is anything there, which appears unlikely. 
33. The Mountain Meadows Ranch has a value of $775,000.00. 
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34. The personal property of the parties has been divided between them by agreement with 
the exception that the Bearcat Pistol which is to go to the Defendant. 
35. The Defendant should receive the Corvette vehicle and personal property in his 
possession. 
36 He also should receive the $7,000.00 worth of cattle. 
37. The Plaintiff should receive her Cadillac and the other personal property in her 
possession. 
38. The Court finds the value of the personal property received by the Plaintiff is $16,725 00 
The Court finds that exceeds her estimate by $2,000.00, because it is the Court's finding that the large 
ring that she has is worth more than was estimated by her. 
39. The Defendant's personal property is worth $54,000.00. That is based upon a higher 
estimate than the Defendant made because the Court finds that the value of the boat was higher than was 
estimated by the Defendant. 
40. The debts of the parties are: 
a. The first mortgage on the home on Lytle Drive is $20,009.83. 
b. The home equity loan on that home is $16,039.58. 
c. The condo note and also a note secured as a third mortgage on the home, is for 
$149,574.69. 
d. The note on the Corvette is $9,767.32. 
e. There are accountants fees in the amount of $ 10,546.00 
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f. The parties have agreed that if there are any debts due on the special improvement 
district near the home, that they will divide that debt half and half. 
41. Looking at the debt obligation, the income producing ability of the Defendant, and the 
property available to the Plaintiff by the Court's decree, the Court, looking at the needs of the parties and 
finding that the Defendant has needs of $2,400.00 per month and has the ability to produce income at 
$3,000.00 a month, and looking at the Plaintiffs ability to produce income, with her needs of $2,000.00 
a month and her receiving $540.00 from employment, and finding that a reasonable rental value for the 
home is $850.00 for a month, which the Court anticipates will generate some income for the Plaintiff, 
and considering that the Plaintiff also has the building lot which is probably something that she could 
sell and live off of for quite a while and maybe not even have to work for a period of time, depending on 
how the development property is sold, the Court finds that a reasonable figure for alimony is a sum of 
$600.00 per month until the development property sells. 
42. Attorney's fees for the Plaintiff are $15,968.00. Attorney's fees for the Defendant have 
been $12,835.00 and the Court finds both these to be reasonable, and the Court complements counsel on 
their work, not only the quality of their work, but the level of their fees in view of the size of this estate. 
43. The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment on the eve of full retirement. His 
doing so deprived the Plaintiff of the benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement account had 
he worked until he became entitled to full retirement benefits. 
44. The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court Order, liquidated his retirement 
account. Although some of those funds were used to assist the Plaintiff with reference to acquisition of 
A. 17 
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her condominium, most of the funds were used to pay a debt incurred in conjunction with the 
Defendant's opening a business against the Plaintiffs will, while the parties were still married, as asset 
which, according to the Court's findings, now has no value. In essence, the Defendant dissipated almost 
all of that retirement account. Plaintiff should receive a greater share of the balance of the marital estate. 
45. The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at the standard of living to which she is 
entitled with the amount of alimony awarded by the Court and her own earned income. According to the 
trial Court's findings, although the Defendant would have sufficient income to meet his needs by paying 
$600.00 per month to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of alimony, still falls 
approximately $900.00 short each month of being able to meet her financial needs. 
46. Although, technically, the Plaintiff may not have acquired a financial interest in the 
Mountain Meadows Ranch because of work she performed on that property during the parties' marriage 
and while it was still titled in the name of the Defendant's parents, equitably, her contribution toward 
that asset ought to be considered and supports the Court's ultimate award of marital property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
47. The ranch is awarded to Defendant. 
48. The condominium and home and lot are awarded to Plaintiff. 
49. Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the 
exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant. 
50. Defendant shall assume the debts of the parties. 
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51. Defendant shall receive Hi-Desert Marine, subject to the encumbrances and debts 
thereon, and the Anna Coating business, subject to the encumbrances and debts thereon. 
52. ' Plainitiff shall be indemnified by Defendant so that the assets that she receives shall be 
free and clear, which is not the case right now. The Court anticipates that when the development 
pioperty sells, that will be the case. At that time, the parties can get out of debt and get some peace in 
their lives. 
53. I he development piopcity shall be equally divided belwcen the paitics An undi\ ulul 
one-half interest is awarded to each, and it should be sold as quickly as possible, and as quickly as is 
reasonable. 
54. The Plaintiff is awarded alimony of $600.00 per month until the development propcih 
sells. 
55. Upon the sale of the development property, alimony shall be reduce to the sum of 
$300.00 per month because the parties will have generated adequate income to substitute for that cash 
flow need. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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56. In view of the division of the properties and the economic circumstance of the parties, it 
would be error for the Court to require either party to pay the others attorney's fees and costs; therefore, 
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this h day of Febroar/1997 
BYTH 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND-CONTENTr* 
^ M I C H A E L WESTFAU 
GALLIAN, \ f e T F A l X w i L C O X AND WRIGHT 
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SAMUEL G. DRAPER (Bar No. 7050) 
HUGHES & READ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 673-4892 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRLENE LYTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLINTON EZRA LYTLE, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT IN RE: 
ALIMONY, PROPERTY 
DIVISION, DEBT ALLOCATION, 
AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 954500316 
Judge James L. Shumate 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for trial on the 10th day of October, 1996, before the Court, 
sitting without a jury, the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding, 
the Plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by her counsel, G. Michael Westfall, of Gallian, 
Westfall, Wilcox and Wright, and the Defendant appearing in person and being represented by his 
counsel, Samuel G. Draper, of Hughes & Read, and the Court having granted Defendant's motion to 
bifurcate, and a decree of divorce having been entered on or about September 8, 1995, reserving the 
issues of support, property division, and attorney's fees for determination at trial, and the Court having 
heard the evidence offered by the parties admitted herein, and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES THAT: 
1. The Mountain Meadows Ranc&is a&Jarded to Defendant. 
3 Y _ 
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2. The following real property is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to the same and as between Plaintiff and Defendant: 
a. The condominium located at 489 North Ridgeview Drive, St. George, 84770, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat "I", a Planned Unit Development, 
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington 
County Recorder. 
b. The home located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, Utah 84770, more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42 
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East 
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning. 
c. The building lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black 
Hill in St. George, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in 
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah. 
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record. 
3. Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the 
exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant. 
4. Should the parties own an asset in Carson City, Nevada, which at the time of trial 
appeared unlikely, the parties are each awarded one-half interest therein. 
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2. The following real property is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to the same and as between Plaintiff and Defendant: 
a. The condominium located at 489 North Ridgeview Drive, St. George, 84770, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat "I", a Planned Unit Development, 
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington 
County Recorder. 
b. The home located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, Utah 84770, more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42 
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East 
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning. 
c. The building lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black 
Hill in St. George, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in 
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah. 
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record. 
3. Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the 
exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant. 
4. Should the parties own an asset in Carson City, Nevada, which at the time of trial 
appeared unlikely, the parties are each awarded a one-half interest therein. 
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5. Defendant shall assume the debts of the parties. 
6. If there are any debts due on the special improvement district near the home, the same 
will be divided equally between the parties. 
7. Defendant shall receive Hi-Desert Marine, subject to the encumbrances and debts 
thereon, and the Arma Coating business, subject to the encumbrances and debts thereon. 
8. Plaintiff shall be indemnified by Defendant so that the assets that she receives shall be 
free and clear, which is not the case right now. The Court anticipates that when the development 
property sells, that will be the case. At that time, the parties can get out of debt and get some peace in 
their lives. 
9. The development property shall be equally divided between the parties. An undivided 
one-half interest is awarded to each, and it should be sold as quickly as possible, and as quickly as is 
reasonable. 
10. The Plaintiff is awarded alimony of $600.00 per month until the development property 
sells. 
11. Upon the sale of the development property, alimony shall be reduce to the sum of 
$300.00 per month because the parties will have generated adequate income to substitute for that cash 
flow need. 
// 
// 
// 
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12. In view of the division of the properties and the economic circumstance of the parties, it 
would be error for the Court to require either party to pay the others attorney's fees and costs, therefore, 
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein 
r— May* 
DATED this L? day of -February; 1997 
BY THE COURT. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTEN1 
G. Ml&frAEL ^ E S T F X L L 
, tjALLIAN, W E S T F X L L , WILCOX AND WRIGHT 
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Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order Supplementing',; y 
Findings of Fact 
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GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #34 34 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRLENE LYTLE, 
Plaintiff 
vs . 
CLINTON EZRA LYTLE, 
Defendant 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL, ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
SUPPLEMENTING FINDINGS OF 
FACT 
Civil No. 954500316 
Judge James L. Shumate 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on 
Tuesday, the 25th day of March, 1997 on the Defendant's Motion to 
(1) Amend or Make Additional Findings, (2) Amend or Alter Judgment, 
and (3) For a New Trial and Supporting Memorandum and on the 
Plaintiff's response to that motion. The Plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by her counsel of record, G. Michael 
Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by his counsel 
of record, Samuel G. Draper and Michael D. Hughes of the lav/ firm 
of HUGHES & READ. Counsel for both parties wero heard with 
reference to the Defendant's pending motion and the Plaintiff's 
A. 25 
05^dR«iy%Bfft!fetifilBtf8fi.New T r i a 1' 0 r d e r Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order Supplementing 
Finding©l&CwSagtt he presentation of oral argument and review of the 
pleadings on file, including the legal authority cited, the Court 
made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based 
thereon the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
2. The Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is 
denied. 
3. The Findings of Fact of the Court, entered on March 3, 
1997, are hereby amended and the following findings included in the 
amended Findings of Fact: 
a) The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment 
on the eve of full retirement. His doing so deprived the Plaintiff 
of the benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement 
account had he worked until he became entitled to full retirement 
benefits. 
b) The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court 
Order liquidated his retirement account. Although some of those 
funds were used to assist the Plaintiff with reference to 
acquisition of her condominium, most of the funds were used to pay 
a debt incurred in conjunction with the Defendant's opening a 
business against the Plaintiff's will, while the parties were still 
married, an asset which, according to the Court's findings, now has 
no value. In essence, the Defendant dissipated almost all of that 
retirement account. Plaintiff should receive a greater share of 
the balance of the marital estate. 
2 
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c) The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at 
the standard of living to which she is entitled with the amount of 
alimony awarded by the Court and her own earned income. According 
to the trial Court's findings, although the Defendant would have 
sufficient income to meet his needs by paying $600.00 pei month to 
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of alimony, 
still falls approximately $900.00 short each month of being able to 
meet her financial needs. 
d) Although, technically, the Plaintiff may not have 
acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows Ranch because 
of work she performed on that property during the parties' marriage 
and while it was still titled in the name of the Defendant's 
parents, equitably, her contribution toward that asset ought to be 
considered and supports the Court's ultimate award of marital 
property. 
DATED this J J) day of /M/t *l y/ , 1997 
BY THE COURT £ OF Up 
>• ••» ' 
James I*. Shumate"?-
District Court Judgte/^" 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
A^^^rQ /(J&Tt&L 
Samuel G. D r a p e r 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendan t 
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PROPOSED DIVISION OF MARITAL ESTATE 
Property or Debt 
22 acres of 
development 
property 
Building lot 
Personal property 
Home on Lytle 
Drive 
Condominium 
Mortgage on 
condominium 
Hi-Desert Marine 
Business 
ArmaCoating 
Business 
Mortgage on 
marital home 
Home equity line 
on marital home 
Debt on 
Defendant's 
Corvette 
Accountant fees 
Method of Acquisition 
Gift from Defendant's 
parents (originally 40 
acres) 
Acquired during 
marriage with property 
gifted from Defendant's 
parents 
Acquired during 
marriage 
Gift from Defendant's 
parents 
Purchased by Plaintiff 
after separation 
Incurred after 
separation 
Acquired by parties 
during marriage 
Acquired by Defendant 
since separation 
Incurred during 
marriage 
Incurred during 
marriage 
Incurred during 
marriage 
Value of marital assets awarded to each 
party: 
Percentage of marital assets awarded to 
each party: 
Value 
Awarded to 
Defendant 
634,000 
54,000.00 
-149,574.69 
-150,000.00 
0.00 
-20,009.83 
-16,039.58 
-9,767.32 
[ -10,546.00 
332,062.58 
49.69% 
Value 
Awarded to 
Plaintiff 
35,000.00 
16,725.00 
149,500.00 
135,000.00 
1 336,225.00 
50.31% 
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